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Abstract
The impact of product reviews on consumer purchasing behavior is empirically well
documented. This can create perverse incentives for firms to offer reviewers side payments
(”bribes”) in exchange for biased reviews for their products. The presence of bribes
distorts the information in reviews away from its first-best levels, and consequently leads to
detrimental effects on consumer utility. This paper builds a dynamic two-sided reputation
model where a reviewer can inflate her reviews in exchange for bribes. The problem the
reviewer faces is the following: if she accepts bribes and misrepresents her reviews, then
she builds her reputation as an inaccurate reviewer and eventually makes consumers less
likely to follow her recommendations, which in turn makes firms no longer interested in
offering her a bribe. Can the reviewer retain influence over consumers’ purchasing decisions
while simultaneously accepting bribes and misrepresenting her reviews? We provide a
characterization of the environments that allow this kind of manipulation, and show that
regulatory policies that aim to reduce bribes can lead to undesirable outcomes. Finally, we
show that the absence of bribes can sometimes lead to the lowest possible consumer utility,
and that the introduction of bribes in these environments can restore some of that utility via
implementing second-best information transmission.
1 Introduction
Firms have long recognized the impact that product reviews have on consumer purchasing
behavior, and as a result have attempted to inflate these reviews in order to boost demand.
These attempts have ranged from the farcical, like when Sony fabricated the movie critic ‘David
Manning’ to shower its movies with praise1 to more methodical quid-pro-quo arrangements,
where side payments —“bribes”— are provided by firms in exchange for inflated ratings from
reviewers. A recent example is the case of PewDiePie, a popular YouTube gamer who was at the
center of a settlement between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Warner Bros, after the
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1Sony ended up having to pay a settlement to those consumers who saw the movies based on the reviews of Sony’s
imaginary critic (Guardian (2004)).
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latter was found to have offered thousands of dollars in compensation to reviewers in order to
“promote the game in a positive way and not to disclose any bugs or glitches they found”(FTC
(2016b)).
In this paper, we focus on influential reviewers like the example above, but the model we
build is equally suited to settings like the inspection and certification markets, where one side of
the market makes consumption decisions based on the information it obtains from an expert
who reviews or certifies the products and services offered by the other side of the market.
Obviously, the presence of bribes distorts the information contained in reviews away from its
first-best levels, and as a result can make consumers purchase products of low quality and/or
avoid products of high quality, leading to an overall detrimental effect on consumer utility. This
prompted the FTC to start taking measures against compensated reviews.2 In this paper, we
characterize the environments that are vulnerable to this kind of distortion, and in doing so
uncover interesting properties about the effects of regulations. We also show that the presence
of bribes is not always undesirable, and can in fact lead to an improvement in consumer utility
under some circumstances.
We start by developing a two-sided reputation model that captures the above environments.
A reviewer with a private ability type is situated between consumers and firms. The reviewer’s
type determines her accuracy in evaluating the quality of the products. Consumers learn
this type over time as they compare product reviews with the ex-post realized qualities of the
products. The more accurate the reviewer is, the more the consumers listen to her and the more
influence she wields over their decisions. The reviewer may derive utility from being influential
(for example because she gets more ad revenue on her dissemination channels of choice) and
therefore would like to uphold her reputation with consumers as an accurate reviewer. At the
same time, the reviewer wishes to maintain her reputation (and influence) with the consumers
so that biased reviews actually translate into more consumption and greater profits for the firm,
thereby making the firm willing to bribe.
The above setup resembles classic reputation problems (e.g. Kreps and Wilson (1982); Sobel
(1985)) in that the reviewer wants to convince consumers that she is committed to playing as
her true type. This however is complicated by the possibility that firms might offer bribes to
the reviewer in exchange for biased reviews. The reviewer therefore finds herself simultaneously
involved in two games. She can try to increase her payoff by maximizing her influence with
consumers, but she can also increase her payoff by accepting bribes from firms. These two
2In addition to the example cited earlier, the FTC also started fining companies that are involved in review
manipulation, see FTC (2019).
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objectives are incompatible, since maximizing influence requires her to build a reputation for
accurate reviews, which deters firms from offering her a bribe. On the other hand, accepting
bribes requires the reviewer to misrepresent her reviews, which can diminish or completely
remove her influence, and if that happens then firms are no longer interested in bribing the
reviewer since she is no longer influential. How should the reviewer play this game? Can she
maintain influence and accept bribes? And what is the impact of this behavior on consumer
utility?
Contribution and overview of results We answer the above questions by analyzing a dynamic,
long-run repeated-game model. Our model is unique in that it captures the dynamics of these
markets while explicitly modeling all strategic actors (consumers, reviewers, and firms) in an
incomplete information setting. This leads us to study signaling and cheap-talk games, the
equilibria of which are notoriously difficult to analyze and refine (see Chen et al. (2008)), and
this analysis is further complicated by the presence of two simultaneous and interlinked games
(reviewer vs. consumers and reviewer vs. firms). Nevertheless, under rudimentary assumptions,
we are able provide a technical characterization (existence and uniqueness) in Theorems 1
and 2 and a characterization of the optimal equilibrium strategies for all players in Theorems
3 through 5. We use these results to describe which environments are “bribe-proof”. An
environment is bribe-proof if the reviewer always reports her true signal. This can happen
as a result of firms choosing not to offer bribes (because they believe that bribing will not be
profitable for them), or as a result of the reviewer not accepting bribes even when they are offered
(because of the damage to her reputation). We find that in the unique equilibrium, a reviewer
either declines bribes and reports truthfully (in which case consumer utility is maximized) or
commits to mimicking a lower type (i.e. less-skilled) reviewer forever (thereby distorting the
information that consumers get away from first-best). This characterization allows us to derive
the following results, together with their policy implications:
Bribes and Consumer Utility: Our model includes an auditing technology that operates
independently of all agents. This means that a firm that chooses to bribe can be caught and
punished. The strength of the auditing technology determines the proportion of firms that are
willing to offer bribes (but who may still choose not to offer bribes in equilibrium) so that the
higher the audit rate, the lower the proportion of those firms. While it is natural to think that
decreasing the proportion of firms that offer bribes should improve consumer utility, Theorem 6
and Proposition 4 show that this is not necessarily the case. In particular, an increase in the
audit rate that dissuades more firms from offering bribes may actually transition the system
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from being bribe-proof to becoming vulnerable to bribes and information distortion.3 This non-
monotonicity implies that such regulations should not be undertaken unless they substantially
decrease the proportion of firms that are willing to offer bribes, instead of merely reducing it.
Our model also allows us to derive interesting comparative statics that describe how
consumer utility changes as a function of the ex-ante information that the market has
about the skill of the reviewer. When reviewers report truthfully, consumer utility is always
increasing in the quality of this information. However, Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 together
with Example 3 illuminate an important counterintuitive finding: increasing the quality of
information (through an increase in the precision of the reviewer or an increase in the likelihood
that the reviewer is highly skilled, or both) may not necessarily lead to better outcomes for
consumers when some firms are willing to bribe. As we show, more skilled reviewers have more
leeway in inflating their reviews, and this makes the prospect of bribing them more appealing
for firms. Thus this improvement in reviewer quality might allow both reviewers and firms to
extract greater surplus through bribes and inflated reviews at the cost of hurting consumers.
Finally, while bribes are generally harmful to consumer utility, their presence can sometimes
increase the efficiency of the system. When writing reviews is costly (e.g., time consuming),
reviewers can become extremely noisy or stop writing reviews altogether. Proposition 7 shows
that by offering bribes, the private market provides a mechanism that funds the process of
review writing. Crucially, the reviews still have to be relatively informative, because otherwise
consumers will stop listening to the reviewer’s recommendations and she will lose her value
to the bribing firms. Thus, while the information in these reviews is necessarily distorted away
from its first-best levels, bribes can still provide the correct incentives to implement second-best
information transmission in the marketplace.
Related Literature The effect of reviews on consumer purchasing behavior is empirically
well-documented in Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006); Senecal and Nantel (2004) and Dellarocas
et al. (2007). The phenomenon of influential online reviewers is relatively recent, but bears
some resemblance to, for example, earlier work that documents the effect of movie critics on
viewership (e.g. Reinstein and Snyder (2005)). There is also an emerging literature on how
consumers learn from reviews, e.g. Ifrach et al. (2019) and Acemoglu et al. (2017), which adopts
a Bayesian sequential learning approach where consumers leave reviews of products and these
reviews are used by future consumers to determine the quality of the product. Chen and
3Recall that an environment does not necessarily admit bribes simply because some firms are willing to offer
them, given the current audit rate. If these bribes are not profitable for the firm, or not sufficient to compensate the
reviewer, there may be no bribes in equilibrium even when some firms would be willing to bribe.
4
Papanastasiou (2019) study how a firm can manipulate this sequential learning process through
planting an initial “fake” purchase, while Dellarocas (2006) is an earlier work that studies a game
where firms try to manipulate opinions in online forums and shows when such manipulation is
beneficial to consumers or firms. These papers are part of a broader literature that examines
manipulation of agents in various online settings (e.g. Candogan and Drakopoulos (2017);
Belavina et al. (2018); Papanastasiou (2018); Mostagir et al. (2019)).
By contrast, our paper tries to capture these environments when consumers and firms
interact through a reviewer, who, unlike the work mentioned up to this point, is a strategic self-
interested player herself, and so we model all three types of actors. This relates our paper to the
literature where an expert communicates information to a buyer on behalf of a seller. Lizzeri
(1999) studies the incentives of a monopolistic expert to accurately reveal information and
Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) study how firms can compete for market share by trying to influence
the expert through kickbacks. In a similar vein, the recent paper of Fainmesser and Galeotti
(2019) studies competition between influencers who choose how much ‘sponsored’ vs. ‘organic’
content to provide. Our work differs from these papers on two important dimensions. First, the
expert (reviewer) in our model has an unknown type that must be learned by both sides of the
market, and this learning happens through communicating about products of unknown quality.
The static models in the above papers preclude the possibility of learning in this incomplete
information setup.4 Second, by incorporating this temporal aspect into our model, we are
able to show how the expert can utilize this type uncertainty along with the dynamics of the
environment to consistently shape the buyers’ and sellers’ beliefs, leading to different outcomes
from the static models.
Finally, our work builds on classic models of reputation (e.g., Kreps and Wilson (1982);
Milgrom and Roberts (1982); Sobel (1985); Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992)), but unlike this
literature, the reviewer in our setup plays two simultaneous reputation games on both sides
of the market. This brings our paper closer to the recent work on two-sided reputation, as
in Bar-Isaac and Deb (2014) and Bouvard and Levy (2017), where, in the latter, an agent is
faced with the problem of providing certification for a seller in order to attract buyers in a
two-period model. Our work shares some similarities with this paper in that the agent must
trade off high precision (and more influence) with low precision (and increased likelihood of
over-representing the true quality), but there are also several important distinctions. First,
4For example, Fainmesser and Galeotti (2019) assume that the expert’s choice of how much sponsored content to
post is observed by consumers, with the reasoning being that if the game were to be repeated, the expert would be
detected by consumers if she deviates from that choice over time. By contrast, the presence of a hidden type and
reputation in our model jointly allow the expert to consistently misrepresent her type without being detected.
5
while reputation is a long-run concept that is naturally studied in an infinite horizon setting
(see Mailath et al. (2006)), it is necessarily temporary in a two-period model, which leads to
qualitatively different results. Infinite-horizon models imply that the agent is disciplined more
strictly and cannot misrepresent herself extensively for short-term gains, and hence the findings
of Bouvard and Levy (2017) do not generalize to these interactions once the horizon extends
beyond two periods. There are also differences that stem from that fact that while firms elect to
be certified, they cannot choose not be reviewed, as per the Consumer Review Fairness Act of
2016 (FTC (2016a)). Finally, we explore different comparative statics and welfare implications,
e.g. changing the strength of the auditing technology, as opposed to the effects from additional
competition.
In the next section, we provide an example of some of the main ideas in the paper. Our formal
model and equilibrium preliminaries are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides existence
and uniqueness results, while Section 5 describes the equilibrium strategies played by all three
player types. Section 6 brings together all the previous technical results to examine the effect of
bribes and regulation on consumer utility, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Reduced-Form Example
We provide intuition for our results through a stylized example. To facilitate exposition, we
abstract away several details of our full model. The points at the end of this section help connect
the ideas presented in the example with the corresponding results in the paper.
A reviewer repeatedly interacts with a mass of consumers, where she writes reviews that
consumers use to make purchasing decisions. Firms arrive sequentially in discrete time, and
some of these firms are ‘friends’ of the reviewer. The reviewer would like to help her friends out,
but is impartial to those who are not her friends. Can the reviewer successfully and repeatedly
steer consumers towards products sold by her friends without having the Bayesian consumers
adjust their consumption decisions to account for this?
We provide some details to answer this question. Firm t arrives at time t and sells a product
whose quality qt is distributed as N (0, 1). After sampling the product, the reviewer observes a
signal st = qt + εt where εt ∼ N (0, σ2ω) and is i.i.d across time. The reviewer’s private type/skill
ω is either High (σH = 1) or Low (σL = 2), and both types are equally likely. After observing
her signal, the reviewer posts a review rt, which may or may not be the same as st. Naturally, a
reviewer cannot pretend to be more accurate than she actually is, so type H can pretend to be
type L but the opposite is not possible. If the reviewer always told the truth regardless of her
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type, then type L reviews are distributed as rLt ∼ N (0, 5) and type H reviews are distributed as
rHt ∼ N (0, 2).
The true quality qt is eventually revealed to every one before the next period. Consumers
are aware of the possible reviewer types and the probabilities with which they occur, so they
can learn the reviewer’s skill by comparing her reviews with the revealed qualities over time.
Consumers are also aware that some firms might be friends of the reviewer and that she might
want to favor these firms, but they do not know which firms are friends and which are not.
If consumers believe that the reviewer is intentionally misrepresenting her reviews, they stop
listening to her forever (which we assume, for the purpose of this example, is an outcome that
the reviewer wants to avoid). Note that if the reviewer systematically boosts the reviews of her
friends, then she will be behaving in a way that is inconsistent with being either typeL or typeH,
which will be reflected in the distribution of her reviews being different from the distributions
associated with these types. Consumers will then find out the reviewer is not telling the truth
and punish her (by, for instance, ignoring her recommendations in the future).
Before they make their purchasing decisions, consumers optimally extract information
about the quality qt from the review rt. They do this through adjusting the review by the precision
of what they believe the reviewer’s type is (this is the standard inverse-variance weighting
formula, as in, e.g. Cochran (1954), that we also discuss in Section 5.2). In particular, if
consumers believe that the reviewer’s type is ωˆ ∈ {L,H} then the expected quality given the
review rt and the type ωˆ is given by
E[qt|rt, ωˆ] = rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
Now suppose that in this sequence of firms, with probability 1/2 a firm is a friend of the
reviewer and with probability 1/2 it is not. Let Zt be the random variable indicating whether
firm t is a friend (Zt = +1) or not (Zt = −1). Assume that the reviewer is indeed type H but
that no one else knows this. As mentioned, if she reports truthfully, then her review for any firm
(friend or not) is distributed as rt ∼ N (0, 2), and consumers, having learned that the reviewer is
typeH, would believe that the expected quality given a review rt is equal toE[qt|rt, ωˆ = H] = rt/2
and therefore the average quality belief for any firm is
Eqt [E[rt|qt]/2] = 0.
i.e. as expected, when the reviewer behaves truthfully, consumers do not prefer friends to non-
friends, as both types get the same reviews on average. Instead of reporting truthfully however,
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the reviewer can pretend to be type L, but she can do it in a specific way that benefits her
friends as follows: she takes her signal st, injects noise ε′t, and writes a review r′t = st + ε′t,
where ε′t = |Xt| · Zt and Xt ∼ N (0, σ2L − σ2H) = N (0, 3). It is easy to see that ε′t ⊥ st and
ε′t ∼ N (0, 3). Therefore, r′t ∼ N (0, 5). Importantly, r′t is statistically unidentifiable from the
random variable rLt ∼ N (0, 5) which, as we mentioned earlier, is the distribution of the reviews
written by a truthtelling reviewer of typeL. In particular, if the reviewer behaves in this way then
consumers cannot distinguish whether she is indeed typeL, or is a typeH pretending to be type
L (and biasing her friends in the process).
Now, notice that even though the reviews over all firms are normally distributed, the reviews for
friends are distributed as a half-normal, and so the average review for friends of quality qt is:
E[r′t|qt] = E[st + ε′t|qt] = E[st + |Xt| |qt] = qt +
√
6
pi
whereas the average review for non-friends of quality qt is:
E[r′t|qt] = E[st + ε′t|qt] = E[st − |Xt| |qt] = qt −
√
6
pi
From the consumer’s perspective, we know that, having learned that the reviewer is playing as
type L, she believes the expected quality given a review r′t is equal to E[qt|r′t, ωˆ = L] = r
′
t
1+σ2L
=
r′t/5, which means that the average quality belief for friends is:
Eqt [E[r′t|qt]/5] =
√
6
25pi
and similarly, consumers (on average) believe the quality of non-friends to be −
√
6
25pi . Because
consumers cannot differentiate between which firms are friends or not friends, they will
inherently be biased toward friends of the reviewer, unless the reviewer’s true type is actually
L.
The previous example shows that the reviewer can inject noise into her reviews in a particular
way that ends up biasing consumers towards the firms that she prefers. Note that while this
dilutes the information in the review, it does not completely remove its value to consumers, and
so they continue perusing the reviews despite the possibility that they are biased. Importantly,
and as mentioned above, consumers cannot tell whether the reviewer is a real type L or is a type
H pretending to be type L: the former cannot bias the consumer towards certain products, but
the latter can.
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This example leaves open several questions that we address in the paper. We state these
questions below and reference the results that include their answers at the end of each question.
1. As we saw in the example, the reviewer is misrepresenting her true signal to help her
friends. Can she always do this without consumers learning (and adjusting) to this?
(Theorems 3 and 4).
2. For simplicity, we assumed in the above example that some firms are friends of the
reviewer. In our full model however, being a friend arises endogenously through those
firms who choose to offer the reviewer a bribe (and hence become friends). In the model,
firms are myopic and bribes are not contractible, so it is possible that the reviewer collects
the bribe and does not follow through with a biased review. Firms, anticipating this, might
not want to offer a bribe to begin with. Does the equilibrium of this game admit situations
where the reviewer still gets (some) firms to offer bribes? (Theorems 2 and 5).
3. Generally, and as can be observed in the above example, the presence of bribes hurts
consumer utility as consumers become biased towards certain products and against others
(Proposition 2). In our example, half of the firms did not offer bribes. How does consumer
utility change if the proportion of firms willing to offer bribes is different from half?
(Theorem 6 and Proposition 4).
4. In this example, the different reviewer types were given by σL = 2 and σH = 1 and were
equally likely. How do consumer utility and the size of bribes change as we decrease the
skills of the reviewer (e.g., σL = 4 and σH = 2) or change the probability of her type (e.g.,
the reviewer is high-skill with probability 80%)? (Propositions 5 and 6).
As mentioned in the introduction, our model allows the possibility that the reviewer derives
utility from being influential, independent of whether she accepts bribes. By accepting bribes
and pretending to be a worse type, the reviewer loses some of that influence with consumers.
Theorem 6 and Example 2 show how the tradeoff between influence and accepting bribes shape
the decision of the reviewer and consequently, consumer utility. In the example in this section,
if the reviewer cares a lot about her influence, she may choose not to favor her friends, and as a
consequence, would not receive bribes. Our model also allows the reviewer to have no inherent
value for influence, and Proposition 7 examines whether bribes can actually improve consumer
utility in that case. In particular, the reviewer’s friends may provide funding to the reviewer, who
might otherwise choose not to write any reviews at all.
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3 Model
We consider the following model. Firms are agents that produce and sell a good to a unit mass
of consumers on [0, 1]. Firms arrive sequentially in discrete time, and “market” their product to
consumers through a reviewer, who samples the firm’s product and writes a review. Consumers
then choose whether to listen to the reviewer and whether to purchase the good. The reviewer
and consumer are infinitely-lived.
3.1 Timing
At t = 0, the skill of the reviewer, ω, is drawn from a known Bernoulli distribution over the finite
type space Ω = {L,H} (for Low and High-skill, respectively), where ω = H with probability p.
These skill types correspond to the reviewer’s precision, σω, in assessing the firm’s product, with
σH < σL. The reviewer knows her own precision σω, but no other agent (i.e. firm or consumer)
does. The following sequence of events happens at every time t ≥ 1:
(a) Firm t arrives with a good of random quality qt, which is drawn from a standard normal
distribution qt ∼ N (0, 1).
(b) The reviewer does not directly observe the quality qt of the good, but instead receives an
unbiased, noisy signal st. In particular, st = qt + εt where εt is i.i.d. across time, and εt ∼
N (0, σ2ω).
(c) The reviewer posts a review rt ∈ R ∪ {∅} of the product. Note that the reviewer can abstain
from posting a review, but if she does post a review, she incurs a cost C. This cost may
account for her time examining and using the product, producing media to disseminate her
review over the approporiate channel(s), etc. Before posting the review, the firm may offer a
bribe bt to the reviewer, representing a “side payment” so that the reviewer speaks favorably
about the product.
(d) Consumers have a belief pit about the type of the reviewer. Every consumer i ∈ [0, 1] observes
the review rt and then, based on rt and pit, chooses whether to purchase the good xi,t ∈ {0, 1}
at unit price.
(e) Consumers who elect xi,t = 1 are active consumers, and receive feedback about qt through
their observable payoff. Each active consumer receives an experience given by ei,t = qt+ηi,t,
where ηi,t are i.i.d., distributed symmetrically around zero, and have finite variance.
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(f) After the period is over, the true quality qt of the product is revealed through a public signal
observed by everyone. This can be thought of as a critical or consumer consensus that
emerges after the product has been out in the marketplace for a while.5
3.2 Payoffs
We now describe the payoff structure for all three agent types:
Consumers The continuum of consumers on [0, 1] have heterogeneous preferences for quality.
Each consumer i has an outside option φi she can obtain (for the same unit price) instead of
purchasing the good. Throughout the rest of the paper, we will impose the following structure
on φi:
Assumption 1. φi is increasing in i, with limi→0 φi = −∞ and limi→1 φi =∞.
This assumption guarantees that for any quality qt, some positive fraction of consumers
always purchases the good and some positive fraction of consumers abstain. Consumers are
myopic and maximize their current-period utility given posted reviews rt and beliefs pit; that is,
consumer i chooses her consumption xi,t ∈ {0, 1} according to:
x∗i,t(rt, pit) = arg max
xi,t∈{0,1}
E[(ei,t − φi)xi,t|rt, pit]
It is easy to see that each consumer will employ a cutoff strategy x∗i,t(rt, pit) = 1 iffE[qt|rt, pit] ≥ φi.
Therefore, we can define X∗t (rt, pit) = µ
(
{i : x∗i,t(rt) = 1}
)
, where µ is the Lebesgue measure, as
the total consumption of the product.6 Note thatX∗t depends on both the review rt and also the
history of reviews and observations from the consumer in the past, via the belief pit.
Firms Firms receive a payoff proportional to the number of active consumers 0 < X∗t < 1 (i.e.,
those who purchase the good) less any bribes they pay to the reviewer, bt. We may normalize
the bribe payment to be in product units. Thus, we can write the total payoff of the firm simply
as Ut = X∗t (rt, pit) − bt. Implicit in this form are that firms are myopic (as would be the case
when arriving firms are different in each period). Firms cannot observe bribes from previous
periods, but instead must infer from past play (via public history, as we discuss shortly) whether
a reviewer may be receptive to bribery.
Firms can be one of two types: truthful or strategic. Truthful firms do not offer bribes, while
strategic firms can choose to offer a bribe or not. The proportion of truthful firms depends
5For example, the consensus that the reception on the iPhone 4 was especially poor (see Helft and Bilton (2010))
or that the keyboard on the 2015-2018 Apple MacBook Pros fail often (see Stern (2019)).
6Note under Assumption 1 the set {i : x∗i,t(rt, pit) = 1} is always an interval, so in particular it is always measurable.
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on an auditing technology that operates independently of all agents. This technology might
investigate the firm (with probability α) and such an audit perfectly reveals whether the firm
bribed the reviewer (bt > 0) or not (bt = 0). The higher the audit rate, the higher the proportion of
truthful firms.7 We denote by θ(α) the proportion of truthful firms, which is continuous, strictly
increasing in α and satisfies θ(0) = 0 and θ(1) = 1. Similar to consumers, we assume that firms
have an outside option γ ≥ 0, and that they only enter the market place if they expect their
payoff to exceed that option. 8
Reviewer In addition to her skill type, the reviewer has another private attribute that describes
whether she is truthful or strategic. If she is truthful (with small probability  > 0), then she
always reports her signal (rt = st),9 whereas if she is strategic, she may report any rt desired.10 A
strategic reviewer is a far-sighted agent who may care about her reputation and influence, with
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). We can define the influence, It, of the reviewer to be equal to the
average (squared) deviation in consumption following her review:
It =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(φ−1(E[qτ |rτ , piτ ])− φ−1(0))2
In other words, the reviewer’s influence measures how much the marginal consumption reacts to
her review on average, compared to the baseline of E[qt] = 0. We assume that the reviewer cares
about her influence with propensity β ≥ 0.11 The case β > 0 accounts for the possibility that the
reviewer may derive direct revenue and/or utility from her influence, for example through more
ads on her dissemination channel or through some altruistic or egotistical utility from helping
consumers and influencing their decisions. Reviewers are patient and maximize their (average)
7We assume that firms are heterogeneous in how they respond to getting caught in an audit. To keep our model
parsimonious, we do not explicitly model this response mechanism. For example, firms might have different levels
of risk aversion that is perhaps connected to their reputation in the marketplace, and depending on the audit rate
and the penalty of getting caught it might not be profitable for all of them to offer a bribe. Similarly, firms can have
different cost structures that might again make it profitable for some of them to offer bribes but not others.
8The outside option —which accounts for the fact that firms may have opportunity costs (e.g., other ventures)
when deciding to enter the market— helps eliminate certain unnatural equilibria that arise where the reviewer can
aggressively “punish” the firm for not bribing, thereby soliciting massive bribes just to avoid punishment.
9The existence of a truthful type is a standard assumption in the reputation literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine
(1989)) to eliminate “babbling” equilibria where the reviewer never posts informative reviews, and the consumer
forever assumes her prior belief E[qt|rt] = E[qt] = 0 (see Best and Quigley (2016)).
10Note that because the reviewer’s payoff does not directly depend on rt, but only through how rt affects the actions
of the firm and consumer, this is a game of repeated cheap talk (with reputational concerns). This has been studied
in models such as Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006), but unlike this model, the reputation of the reviewer is endogenous
and studied in a fully dynamic setting as opposed to a two-period model with an exogenous continuation payoff.
11For technical reasons, throughout we will always assume β > 0, but will simply write β = 0 to mean β → 0 (i.e.,
the influence propensity vanishes).
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discounted payoff:
V = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1(β · It + bt − ct)
where ct = C if the reviewer posts a review and 0 otherwise. In the special case where the
reviewer does not care or intrinsically value her influence (i.e., β = 0), she simply maximizes
the discounted sum of bribes that she receives over the entire duration of the game, less her
running costs of writing the reviews. Of course, this might still require the reviewer to maintain
some influence with the consumers, otherwise the firms would not be interested in offering her
a bribe.
3.3 Belief Evolution and Equilibrium Preliminaries
The reviewer has a private history ht consisting of both private quality signals {s1, s2, . . . , st−1}
and bribes {b1, b2, . . . , bt−1}. There is also a public history Ht which consists of the reviews
{r1, r2, . . . , rt−1} and the true qualities {q1, . . . , qt−1} in every prior period. Everyone observes
the public history Ht at the beginning of period t, and the reviewer also observes ht.
Firm t and the consumers hold beliefs in period t about the type of the reviewer. This belief
is entirely determined by the public history Ht, given by some pit ∈ ∆({σL, σH}) (whereas,
naturally, the reviewer knows her own type). We consider the following equilibrium concepts
as the reviewer becomes very patient (δ → 1):
1. Consumer-reviewer equilibrium: Consider a (fixed) sequence of bribes bt(Ht) which may
be conditional on the public history. Let b˜t(Ht) be the sequence of bribes that are forced
to zero at every time t where the firm is honest. Then a consumer-reviewer equilibrium
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the dynamic game between the reviewer and the
consumer with bribes given by b˜t(Ht), where bt(Ht) is common knowledge.
2. Full equilibrium: Taking as given the consumer-reviewer equilibrium, each firm at time t
chooses bt(Ht) to maximize its (current-period) profit.
Robust Equilibrium. The above solution concept admits a multiplicity of equilibria. Here,
we introduce a refinement that allow us to obtain uniqueness. The consumer-reviewer game
is a cheap-talk game, which is a subset of signaling games. Unlike other signaling games
though, cheap talk games are notoriously more difficult to refine, with a sizable literature that
proposes different selection arguments (see Chen et al. (2008); Sobel (2009) for a summary and
discussion). For our purposes, we focus on the risk-dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi et al.
(1988)). The reason behind this is simple and intuitive: one of the possible equilibria is what
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we call a babbling-trigger equilibrium (see Best and Quigley (2016)), whereby consumers stop
listening to the reviewer forever if they believe she is a strategic type who is accepting bribes to
inflate her reviews. The fact that babbling-trigger guarantees the reviewer a perpetual payoff of
zero and the fact that the reviewer is uncertain whether consumers will select this equilibrium
jointly provide an incentive for the reviewer to “play it safe” and assume that consumers will
indeed play babbling-trigger. This gives rise to the risk-dominant equilibrium. Second, to
break indifferences, we suppose the auditing technology punishes firms in a way that increases
with the size of the bribe offered. However, we assume the fraction of the penalty which is
proportionate to the bribe is much smaller than the penalty at-large. Therefore, when indifferent
between two or more distinct bribes, firms choose to break ties in favor of the lower bribe. We
say an equilibrium is robust if (i) it is a full equilibrium, and (ii) it satisfies the aforementioned
two conditions.
4 Equilibrium: Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we discuss conditions under which the consumer-reviewer equilibrium, full
equilibrium, and robust equilibrium exist and are unique. We use this as a foundation for
our characterization of equilibrium strategies in Section 5 and for the comparative statics and
second-best characterization in Section 6.
By standard existence results, one can see:
Theorem 1. Given any discount factor δ:
(a) For any fixed bribe scheme bt(Ht), a consumer-reviewer equilibrium exists;
(b) A full equilibrium always exists.
While Theorem 1 guarantees our solution concept is well-posed for any δ, we will focus on the
case of a patient reviewer, i.e. δ → 1. If the reviewer is less patient, she may be able to manipulate
consumers by lying for some time, eventually driving consumers away, and then forever after
abstaining from writing reviews. Because this is unsurprising, we investigate whether any form
of review manipulation can persist forever. We capture this by assuming the reviewer values
payoffs long in to the future, and therefore obtains significant value from her reputation as a
good reviewer. For these same reasons, and because consumers and firms need to learn the
reviewer’s skill over time, we look only at strategies in the limit t→∞.
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Let {bt(δk), rt(δk), Xt(δk)}nk=1 be a sequence of (full) equilibrium strategies for a sequence of
parameters δ, with δk → 1.12 We define a limit equilibrium when δ → 1:
Definition 1. We say the equilibrium strategies (bt, rt, Xt) are a limit equilibrium if for any
sequence δk → 1, there exists a sequence of equilibrium strategies {bt(δk), rt(δk), Xt(δk)}nk=1 that
converges (in sup-norm) to (bt, rt, Xt) as k →∞.
Second, we look at the equilibrium strategies of a limit equilibrium for large t. To do this,
we consider fixed (time-invariant) strategies (b∗, r∗, X∗) and look to see if the limit equilibrium
approaches any strategy of this form as t→∞. Formally:
Definition 2. We say the limit equilibrium approaches a strategy (b∗, r∗, X∗) if
lim supt→∞ ||(b∗t , r∗t , X∗t )− (b∗, r∗, X∗)||∞ = 0.
In such cases, we may refer to (b∗, r∗, X∗) as the limit equilibrium, with a slight abuse of
terminology, but where the distinction should be obvious. Even in this setting, we have a
multiplicity of equilibria because of indifferences that exist for the reviewer. These indifferences
exist because of a lack of commitment by the reviewer: if the firm bribes the reviewer, she is not
committed to giving any particular review.
This multiplicity can be seen most transparently by noting that there is always a trivial
equilibrium. We say a full equilibrium is trivial if incoming firms always offer bribes bt = 0, and
reviewers always report truthfully rt = st. In the one-shot game, the reviewer can always choose
to accept the bribe but then report her belief of the product quality truthfully anyway, and if
the firm is aware the reviewer might do this, then it offers no bribe to begin with. As repeating
the static equilibrium is always a repeated equilibrium, we see that this trivial equilibrium can
exist in any dynamic setting. On the other hand, a full equilibrium is bribing if there exists
bribes (almost surely) at some point along the history of play. Under certain conditions, there
may be no other equilibrium (other than the trivial one) with bribing, in which case we say the
environment is bribe-proof.
As our central focus is on determining whether an environment is bribe-proof or not, we
concentrate on bribes which are maximally-supported between the firm and the reviewer, as we
define next:
Definition 3. We say a limit equilibrium, (b∗1, r∗1, X∗1 ), is maximal, if for any other limit
equilibrium (b∗2, r∗2, X∗2 ), given fixed bribes b∗1, (r∗2, X∗2 ) is still a consumer-reviewer equilibrium,
and b∗1 is the largest bribe supported in any full limit equilibrium with (r∗1, X∗1 ).
12For ease of notation, we have collapsed the firm’s decision about entering the market, and then whether (and
how much) to bribe, into a single choice variable bt. This can be done by introducing an additional action, bt = exit,
which (deterministically) awards the firm its outside option γ.
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In other words, maximality captures the largest bribe amount firms would be willing to give
to reap the benefits of the reviewer’s favoritism. It is then both necessary and sufficient to check
whether the maximal equilibrium is bribe-proof in order to know whether the setting is bribe-
proof under any equilibrium. With this, we obtain the following uniqueness result:
Theorem 2. There always exists a maximal robust equilibrium and it is generically unique.
When the environment is bribe-proof, the unique maximal robust equilibrium coincides with
the trivial equilibrium. The proof of Theorem 2 is the backbone for characterizing the behavior
of the different players in the next section.
5 Equilibrium: Characterization
We now provide a characterization of the unique robust equilibrium strategies. We start with the
reviewer, and provide the general strategy she uses to manipulate (or not) her signal through her
review. Next, we characterize the consumer’s Bayesian consumption decision, given the strategy
of the reviewer in the consumer-review equilibrium. Finally, we comment on the conditions that
allow firms to bribe in the full equilibrium, and use this to analyze consumer welfare.
5.1 Reviewer
First, we define a mimic-down strategy. A reviewer of type ω may mimic any ωˆ with σωˆ ≥ σω.
In other words, the reviewer can misrepresent her precision, but cannot artificially improve her
own skill – she may only “worsen” it. This means that a high-type reviewer may appear as high or
low-type, whereas the low-type must represent herself correctly. Thus the reviewer follows the
following strategy:
(a) If ωˆ = ω, then the reviewer reports truthfully in each period, rt = st.
(b) If ωˆ 6= ω, then the reviewer produces an orthogonal (to st) component of noise ε′t at every
period, where ε′t ∼ N (0, σ2ωˆ − σ2ω). She then reports the review rt = st + ε′t.
Then we obtain the following characterization of reports for the reviewer:
Theorem 3. In the (limit) equilibrium, the reviewer plays the same mimic-down strategy at every
point in time.
The reviewer therefore commits to playing a particular type throughout the entire horizon.
Note that a reviewer following a mimic-down strategy has reviews rt ∼ N (0, 1 + σ2ωˆ). We refer
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to ω as the true type of the reviewer, whereas ωˆ is the effective type she chooses to mimic. As
we show, consumers and incoming firms cannot identify whether the reviewer is of type ωˆ, or
a more skilled type ω mimicking the type ωˆ. For instance, an effective low-type may be a true
low-type, or the high type who has chosen to mimic the low-type by injecting noise into her
review.
5.2 Consumers
For any given effective type ωˆ, we can define the inverse-variance expression for quality given
review rt as:
IV (rt, ωˆ) =
rt/σ
2
ωˆ
1 + 1/σ2ωˆ
=
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
Note here that the 1 in the denominator is a consequence of assuming qt ∼ N (0, 1). This is a
classic signal extraction problem (e.g. Cochran (1954)); take Z = X + Y where X ∼ N (0, 1) and
Y ∼ N (0, σ2Y ). Then E[X|Z = z] = z/σ
2
Y
1+1/σ2Y
(i.e., the prior of N (0, 1) regresses the estimate of X
closer to zero). The consumer thus “tempers” the review on both extremes: she believes very
good reviews overhype the quality, whereas very negative reviews are overly harsh. Given this
we can characterize the optimal consumption decision of every consumer:
Theorem 4. Every consumer (eventually) assigns probability 1 to the correct effective type ωˆ
played by the reviewer. Moreover, E[qt|rt, pit] converges to IV (rt, ωˆ), and consumption X∗t (rt) →
φ−1(IV (rt, ωˆ)).
Reviewers, as in Theorem 3, commit to an effective type which is eventually learned by all
consumers over time. When the reviewer has a more skilled effective type, consumers place a
higher weight on her reviews (and therefore she has more influence) compared to if she has a
lower effective skill. On the other hand, the higher the effective type (e.g. a high type reviewer
acting like her true type), the less leeway the reviewer has in biasing her reviews. While the
reviewer can obtain maximal influence by truth-telling (i.e., choosing ωˆ = ω), but then cannot
differentiate her review on any basis other than her quality signal. The reviewer thus faces
the following tradeoff: if she chooses to mimic a lower skill type, she loses influence from the
precision of her reviews, but has more flexibility to bias her review above or below her signal at
her own discretion.
Theorem 4 shows why the reviewer in Section 2 was able to consistently manipulate the
(Bayesian) consumers into purchasing particular products. Because consumers can only learn
the effective type, they cannot distinguish between a reviewer who is biasing them towards
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specific products (in which case they would stop listening to her) or a reviewer who is just
naturally less precise and favors no firms over others.
5.3 Firms
In the stylized example in Section 2, we assumed that the reviewer has preferences over certain
firms, and we demonstrated how she can benefit the firms she favors through positive reviews.
We now return to our model and recall that each firm that enters is either a truthful type
(with probability θ(α)) or strategic type that may offer bribes to the reviewer in exchange for
preferential reviews (with probability 1−θ(α)), which is controlled by the intensity of the auditing
technology α. We will often write just θ, suppressing the dependence on α.
To prevent situations where firms consistently prefer their outside options to entering the
marketplace, assuming they can receive an honest review without having to bribe, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 2. The firm’s outside option γ is upper-bounded by her fair consumption, denoted
by X¯∗, which is the expected value of consumption under an honest review from the worst-skill
reviewer (i.e., Ert∼N (0,1+σ2L)[φ
−1(rt/(1 + σ2L))]).
One can interpret fair consumption as the worst (ex-ante) consumption the firm should
expect given an honest review, before entering the market. We note this assumption also
guarantees that non-bribing firms who anticipate other firms will not bribe at auditing
technology α, would prefer to enter themselves than accept the outside option.13
For notational convenience, define Nθ(µ, σ2) as the conditional normal distribution of the
bottom θ percentile, and let 1−Nθ(µ, σ2) be the conditional normal distribution of the top (1−θ)
percentile. We obtain the following result:
Theorem 5. Suppose the reviewer is type ω mimicking type ωˆ in equilibrium. Then, on the
equilibrium path at time t:
(a) If the firm is truthful, she enters the market and offers no bribe (bt = 0), and the reviewer writes
the review rt = st + ε′t, where ε′t ∼ Nθ
(
0, σ2ωˆ − σ2ω
)
.
13In reality, if non-bribing firms are aware that some firms may still bribe at audit rate α, a more complex (but
equivalent) model guarantees that some non-bribing firms will still enter. In an effort to not over-complicate our
model, we abstract away from the detail that firms may have heterogeneous outside options. This makes some non-
bribing firms opt out of entering if they believe they will get reviews that are not biased in their favor, but still permits
those with lower outside options to enter. We incorporate this into our model by assuming that the proportion θ is
already calibrated so that it designates only those (non-bribing) firms that find it profitable to both enter and not
bribe, regardless of whether these firms expect a biased-down review.
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(b) If the firm is strategic, she enters the market and offers a bribe (bt = b∗), and the reviewer writes
the review rt = st + ε′t, where ε′t ∼ 1−Nθ
(
0, σ2ωˆ − σ2ω
)
.
If the reviewer decides to mimic a less precise type, she adds additional noise to her review
so she can inject (positive) bias for those firms who bribe her. Truthful firms do not bribe and
are punished by being placed in the bottom θ percentile of this additional adjustment, relative
to the reviewer’s true quality signal. On the other hand, strategic firms do bribe and are rewarded
by being placed in the top θ percentile of this distribution. Therefore, similar to the example in
Section 2, there is systematic bias from the consumers towards the products of bribing firms.
Note that while bribing firms get preferential reviews, the reviewer’s biases do not completely
drown out the true measure of quality in the review, but rather dilutes it. This can be illustrated
in the next example.
Example 1. Suppose there are two reviewer types given by σH = 1 and σL = 2 as in the example
in Section 2, and that these types are equally-likely. If the reviewer is high-skill, she can either
choose to commit to review biasing or not. If the reviewer plays effective precision σˆ, then her
influence is (eventually) given by I∞(σˆ) (see Section 5.4).
Assume that only 50% of firms are willing to bribe at the current auditing rate α (i.e., θ =
1/2) and their outside option is zero (i.e., γ = 0). Consumers are distributed according to the
following piecewise function:
φi =

−∞, if i ∈ [0, 1/3)
1/2, if i ∈ [1/3, 2/3)
∞, if i ∈ (2/3, 1]
which means that 1/3 of the consumers never buy, 1/3 of the consumers buy only if E[qt|rt] ≥
1/2, and 1/3 of the consumers always buy. We can compute the influence directly by noting the
cutoff for the middle consumer group is rt ≥ (1 + σˆ2)/2; therefore:
I∞(σˆ) =
1
9
1
2σˆpi
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
(1+σˆ2)/2
exp(−q2/2) exp
(
−(r − q)
2
2σˆ2
)
dr dq
which yields I∞(1) ≈ 0.0266 and I∞(2) ≈ 0.0146. For the high-type reviewer to mimic low-type,
her average bribe payment must exceed β(I∞(1)− I∞(2)) ≈ 0.012β.
Consider qt, εt ∼ N (0, 1) and ε′t ∼ N (0, 3), all independent. If a firm bribes, then its review is
distributed as rBt = qt + εt + |ε′t|; if it does not bribe, it is distributed as rNBt = qt + εt − |ε′t|. To
compute the benefit of a bribe, we simply calculate the difference in probabilities (from bribing)
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that their review will exceed (1 + σˆ2)/2 = 5/2 when σˆ = L:
1
3
· (P[rBt ≥ 5/2]− P[rNBt ≥ 5/2]) = 13P [(qt + εt)− |ε′t| ≤ 5/2 ≤ (qt + εt) + |ε′t|]
=
1
3
P
[|(qt + εt)− 5/2| ≤ |ε′t|]
=
1
3
(
1− 1
2
√
6pi
∫ 0
−∞
∫ −κ
κ
exp
(
−(κ+ 5/2)
2
4
)
exp
(
−ε
2
6
)
dε dκ
− 1
2
√
6pi
∫ ∞
0
∫ κ
−κ
exp
(
−(κ+ 5/2)
2
4
)
exp
(
−ε
2
6
))
≈ 1
3
(1− 0.75− 0.01) ≈ 0.08
Thus, the firm gains (on average) 8% more of the consumer base by bribing. Since reviewer
types are equally-likely, the true benefit from a bribe is only 4% (because like consumers, firms
also cannot tell whether the reviewer is mimicking down or is actually a low type). Similarly, the
“on-average” bribe to a reviewer will be half of bt, where bt is the bribe amount of a strategic firm.
Therefore, if 0.02 > 0.012β (i.e., β < 5/3) the strategic firm bribes an amount .01 + .006β. On the
other hand, if β > 5/3, the environment is bribe-proof.
Finally, note the consumer’s utility is always worse when there is a bribe equilibrium in
Example 1. We show this formally in Proposition 2, but informally, this occurs because bribes
decrease the precision of the estimator qt|rt, which leads to more ex-post unsatisfied consumers
(higher φi than qt) and more inactive consumers (higher qt than φi) than optimal. In Example 1,
a review rt ≥ (1 + σˆ2)/2 has an expected quality qt of:
E[qt|rt ≥ (1 + σˆ2)/2] = 1
2piσˆΦ−1
(
− (1+σˆ2)2σˆ
) ∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
(1+σˆ2)/2
q exp(−q2/2) exp
(
−(r − q)
2
2σˆ2
)
dr dq
=
1
Φ−1
(
− (1+σˆ2)2σˆ
) · 1
exp
(
σˆ2+1
8
)√
2(σˆ2 + 1)pi
When σ = 1, the above is equal to (2e1/4
√
piΦ−1(−1))−1 ≈ 1.34; when σ = 2, it is equivalent
to (e5/8
√
10piΦ−1(−5/4))−1 ≈ 0.903. As consumer utility is directly proportional to E[qt|rt ≥
(1 + σˆ2)/2] in this example, we see that when the reviewer mimics low-skill, consumer utility
decreases. We explore this next in more detail.
5.4 Influence and Welfare
Based on Example 1, we see that as the high-skill type mimics down, both her influence over
the consumer’s decision and the welfare of the consumer decrease. This holds more generally,
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regardless of the consumer distribution.
Proposition 1. For any φi, the influence It(σˆ) for a reviewer who mimics type ωˆ converges almost
surely as t→∞ to:
I∞(σˆ) =
1√
2pi(1 + σˆ2)
∫ ∞
−∞
(φ−1(E[qt|rt,1σˆ])− φ−1(0))2 exp
(
− r
2
t
2(1 + σˆ2)
)
drt
where I∞(σˆ) is strictly decreasing in the precision σˆ, and 1σˆ is the belief pit that assigns probability
1 to precision type σˆ.
Note that because the reviewer is extremely patient (δ → 1), the value of her influence is
entirely pinned-down by I∞(σˆ). Reviewers who mimic greater precision have a higher impact
on the decisions of consumers. This is true, even though less precise reviews more aggressively
endorse or slander products relative to those with higher precise reviews. Despite this, a mild
endorsement from a high-skilled reviewer carries more weight than a more extreme one from a
reviewer with a worse reputation for accurate reviews. Consumers learn to take such reviews
with a grain of salt. For instance, in Example 1, the low-skill reviewer writes much higher
variance reviews, but is about half as influential on purchasing decisions.
Definition 4. Consumer utility at time t is given by the average consumer utility of active
consumers conditional on reviews rt, CUt =
∫
i∈At|rt(qt − φi) di.14 The average consumer utility
at time t is the time-average of consumer utility up until time t, C¯U t = 1t
∑t
τ=1CUτ .
In other words, consumer utility measures the total surplus of the active consumers, given
the information encoded in the review. The perfectly efficient set of active consumers is precisely
At = φ−1([−∞, qt]), that is, those consumers whose outside option is less than the quality of
the good. However, the set of active consumers conditional on review rt, At|rt, will possibly
contain agents whose outside option exceeds qt or not contain agents whose outside option falls
below qt. The extent to whichAt|rt matches the efficient set of active consumers measures total
welfare.
Proposition 2. Average consumer utility converges almost surely as t→∞ to some C¯U∞(σˆ) which
depends only on the effective type of the reviewer. Moreover, C¯U∞(σˆ) is strictly decreasing in σˆ.
The expected quality of the product, conditional on the review endorsing the product, is lower
for less skilled reviewers. This relates directly to Proposition 1; even when the review threshold
14Equivalently, one can measure total utility by summing over the outside option of inactive consumers and adding
qt · µ(At|rt) (i.e., the utility of active consumers). These two quantities differ only by the constant
∫ 1
0
φi di.
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for purchasing the product is greater, the expected quality is lower. To illustrate again with
Example 1, middle consumers purchase the product only if the low-skill review exceeds 2.5,
whereas they will purchase if the review written by the high-skill reviewer exceeds only 1. Even
so, the expected quality of a product purchased based on the review of the skilled reviewer is
higher (1.34 for H and only 0.903 for L), even though on average the less-skilled review will be
stronger.
We make two additional comments about Proposition 2. The first is that while average utility
for each consumer increases as the reviewer becomes more precise, this does not guarantee
that for a given product, a more precise review leads to higher expected utility. For instance,
if φi = 5 for some consumer i (i.e., the consumer only consumes the best products) and qt <
φi, the consumer would prefer not to consume if she knew the quality with certainty. If the
reviewer has very little precision, the consumer would make the correct decision since E[qt|rt] ≈
E[qt] = 0 pretty much regardless of the review. On the other hand, if the reviewer is more precise,
there is a greater probability that rt will exceed the threshold needed for consumer i to purchase
(and regret it). This does not contradict Proposition 2, however, because on-average (over many
products), the consumer would always prefer a more precise review. Second, we point out that
long-run average consumer utility depends only on σˆ, and nothing else (e.g., frequency or size
of the bribes). Therefore, to gauge consumer welfare effects it is sufficient to characterize the
equilibrium choice of σˆ as a function of other parameters.
6 How do Bribes Impact Consumer Utility?
We now examine the impact of bribes on consumer utility. As a benchmark, we start by
providing a simple characterization of the setting where the auditing technology is perfect and
always catches bribes, so that all firms are truthful. Second, we derive conditions under which,
even if firms could bribe, reviewers prefer to exert full influence by reporting truthfully. This
provides the first-best amount of information transmission, and by Proposition 2, maximizes
consumer utility. The comparative statics and associated policy recommendations arising from
this characterization are particularly interesting. Finally, we show that the absence of bribes can
sometimes lead to the lowest possible consumer utility, and that the introduction of bribes in
these environments can restore some of that utility via implementing second-best information
transmission.
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6.1 Perfect Auditing Technology
Suppose that α = 1, so all firms are truthful (i.e., θ = 1). When this is the case, the reviewer
derives utility solely from her influence. Thus, the reviewer participates in writing reviews only
if her expected long-term utility from influence exceeds the cost of writing them. As such, all
that matters is the relative difference between the reviewer’s propensity for influence, β, and
the cost of writing, C. When the reviewer does write a review, she maximizes her influence by
reporting truthfully, which leads to maximum information transmission. Otherwise, no reviews
are written and consumers can do no better than use their prior for their purchasing decisions.
This is summarized in the next result.
Proposition 3. For every cost C, there exists β∗(C) such that:
(a) If β > β∗(C), the reviewer reports truthfully (rt = st) and consumer utility is maximized;
(b) If β < β∗(C), the reviewer abstains (rt = ∅) and consumer utility is minimized.
Moreover, β∗(C) is (strictly) increasing in the cost C.
Informally, the first-best outcome is always obtained with perfect auditing technology,
assuming reviewers care enough about their influence and the cost of writing a review is not
too high.
6.2 Bribe-Free Environments
Having defined the first-best in the previous section, we now derive conditions under which this
first-best is achieved in the presence of imperfect auditing (i.e., α < 1). Recall from Section 5.3
that fair consumption is the ex-ante expected consumption for a firm when the reviewer is the
worst skill possible but guarantees an honest review. We then make the following definition:
Definition 5. The consumption-influence ratio, ψ, is the ratio of the fair consumption to the
change in influence possible from mimicking, i.e., ψ = (X¯∗ − γ)/(I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)).
The consumption-influence ratio measures the relative value of fair consumption
(discounted by the firm’s outside option γ) to the influence a reviewer must relinquish in order
to accept bribes. When this ratio is large (resp. small), either firms are willing to pay large (resp.
small) bribes for just a fair (as opposed to preferential) treatment, or reviewers are willing to
easily (resp. rarely) compromise influence for bribes. One of the main results of our paper is the
following theorem, which shows that the property of being bribe-proof is not monotonic in the
extent of the auditing technology.
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Theorem 6. Suppose the influence propensity satisfies β > ψ. Then there exists 0 < α < α¯ < 1
such that if α < α or α > α, the setting is bribe-proof.
We show next, by example, that the environment may not be bribeproof with an intermediate
amount of auditing technology, α < α < α¯, even when β > ψ:
Example 2 (Intermediate Auditing and Non-Monotonicity). Let us revisit the setting of
Example 1. We will first show that even when β > ψ, bribes can be possible when the auditing
technology is intermediate (i.e., θ lies well in the interior of [0, 1]). This is because the reviewer
can offer favorable biases to a subset of firms at a price that they both find agreeable. We then
show that Theorem 6 in that when θ gets closer to 0 or 1, this type of biasing is either not
profitable or not doable.
Unlike in Example 1, we will assume firms have an outside option of γ = 0.37. Then the fair
consumption is given by X¯∗ = 13 +
1
3 · P[rL ≥ 5/2] = 13 + 13 · Φ(−
√
5/2) ≈ 0.378, where rL is the
review given by a low-skill (honest) reviewer and Φ is the CDF of the standard normal. Therefore,
the fair consumption net the outside option for the firm is approximately 0.008. This implies the
consumption-influence ratio is equal to ψ = 0.008/(I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)).
When the high-skill reviewer mimics low-skill, she can accept bribes from 50% of the firms,
but loses I∞(σH) − I∞(σL) in influence; simultaneously, the firm gains 13 + 13P[rBt ≥ 5/2] −
max{γ, 13 + 13P[rNBt ≥ 5/2]} (before bribes). Notice that:
P[rNBt ≥ 5/2] = P[(qt + εt)− |ε′t| ≥ 5/2]
=
1√
6pi
∫ ∞
5/2
∫ x−5/2
0
exp
(
−x
2
4
)(
−y
2
6
)
dy dx
= 0.0093
Since γ > 13 +
1
3P[r
NB
t ≥ 5/2], the firm would prefer to stay out instead of enter and not bribe.
The benefit the firm gets from bribing is thus 13 +
1
3P[r
B
t ≥ 5/2]− γ, with:
P[rBt ≥ 5/2] = P[(qt + εt) + |ε′t| ≥ 5/2]
=
1√
6pi
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
5/2−x
exp
(
−x
2
4
)(
−y
2
6
)
dy dx
= 0.264
Therefore, the payoff to the firm from bribing, assuming the reviewer is high-skill, is 1/3 +
1/3(0.264) − 0.37 = 0.0513. Since both types are equally-likely, the true benefit is half, which
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means roughly the maximal bribe is b∗ = 0.026. Therefore, the largest “average” bribe the
reviewer can solicit is half of this (since only half the firms bribe), which is equal to 0.013.
Is this setting bribeproof? Let us consider some β = ψ + ν, for small ν > 0. The loss of
influence for the reviewer is β · (I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)) = 0.008 + ν · (I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)), whereas the
bribes she can receive are as large as 0.013. Therefore, there exists a bribing equilibrium when
θ = 1/2, even though β > ψ.
In the case of θ close to 1, note that the largest bribe any reviewer could solicit is 1/3 by
(1 − θ) fraction of the firms. Thus, for this β, as long as the auditing technology is good enough
such that θ > 0.98 (i.e., fewer than 2% of firms possibly bribe), these bribes are not sufficient to
compensate for the damage in reviewer influence. On the other hand, when θ is close to 0, by
entering and bribing the firm gets slightly more than fair consumption, X¯∗, as opposed to not
entering and receiving the outside option. Therefore, the maximal bribe would be slightly above
b∗ = .008, but this does not compensate the reviewer sufficiently for her loss in influence when
β > ψ. Thus, both of these environments are bribeproof, as predicted by Theorem 6.
Theorem 6 (along with Example 2) describes a phase transition whereby the environment
is bribe-proof when there is little auditing technology. Once the auditing technology increases
beyond a certain threshold the environment may be susceptible to bribes and continues to be
so in an intermediate region, and then transitions again to being bribe-proof as the auditing
technology stops sufficiently many firms from bribing. The reasoning behind Theorem 6, as
outlined in Example 2, is the following. Recall that the adjustment noise that the reviewer adds
to the reviews of bribing firms is drawn from a normal distribution that is parametrized by the
proportion of truthful firms θ. As α→ 0, θ becomes small enough that it makes the bias received
by a bribing firm not worth much. Consequently, the firm only offers a small bribe that is not
enticing enough for the reviewer to give up some of her influence, and therefore she reports
truthfully and the environment is bribe-proof.
At the other end, when α > α¯, the fraction of bribing firms is low enough that it becomes
unprofitable for the reviewer to trade off her influence with the bribes she collects. This makes
her keep her influence by reporting truthfully, which again leads to a bribe-proof environment.
It is in the intermediate region [α, α] that the reviewer and the strategic firms are both better
off in the presence of bribes: the reviewer can credibly convince consumers that she is a lower
effective type and strategic firms find that the bias they receive in that case is worth more sizable
bribes. This in turn make it profitable for the reviewer to trade influence for these larger bribes.
Theorem 6 has immediate policy implications. This is because interventions that aim
to reduce the number of bribing firms can move the whole system from the bribe-proof
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environment [0, α) to the regime [α, α] that admits bribes and reduces welfare, essentially
accomplishing the opposite goal of what the intervention is designed for. Similarly, even when
the proportion of truthful firms is high enough and the environment is bribe-proof, a small
slip that takes that proportion below θ¯ is all that is required for the environment to revert
back to being vulnerable to bribes. These non-monotone welfare conclusions, when varying
the intensity of the auditing technology, generalize immediately to more arbitrary consumer
distributions by the following result:
Proposition 4. There exists β∗, p¯, cutoffs 0 < α1 < α2 < α3 < α4 < 1, and an outside option
for the firm, γ, such that α ∈ (0, α1) ∪ (α4, 1) is bribeproof, but consumer utility is strictly below
first-best levels (i.e., there are bribes) when α ∈ (α2, α3) for all p > p¯.
The next result examines whether the environment is bribe-proof as a function of the
difference between the possible reviewer skills. We see that the behavior is again not monotone:
if reviewers have comparable skills, then there is little to be gained by the firm if the reviewer
mimics down, since by doing so she resembles someone who does not look that different from
her to begin with, and that makes bribing unattractive. On the other hand, if the skill gap
between reviewers is too high, then there might be no bribe that will make it profitable for the
reviewer to relinquish this much influence when she pretends to be a much worse type. This
occurs for two reasons. First, the reviewer sacrifices the payoff she gets from exerting higher
influence by accepting these bribes. Second, and more importantly, when the skill gap is large,
firms are unwilling to pay bribes to a reviewer who has little influence on the decisions of the
consumers. These together imply that consumer welfare is non-monotone in the difference in
reviewer skills.
Proposition 5. Fix some β > 0 and let ∆ = σL − σH be the difference in the precisions of the most
extreme types. Then first-best levels of consumer welfare are attained as lim∆→0 or lim∆→∞.
The existence of bribing examples (i.e., Example 1) should convince the reader that when
∆ is in an intermediate range, consumer welfare may be below first-best levels. Proposition 5
highlights that the property of being bribe-proof is more a matter of relative skill levels than
absolute skill levels: whether bribes exist in the system depends on if the reviewer can
successfully imitate a less informative reviewer, without losing her influence over consumer
decisions altogether.
Finally, our last comparative static shows that the role that prior beliefs about the reviewer’s
skill have on welfare can be quite interesting. In particular, when the prior beliefs that
consumers and firms have about the reviewer skill move in a direction that makes it more likely
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that the reviewer is low skill, then information transmission from the reviewer to consumers
increases and welfare increases as well (holding fixed the true type of the reviewer). Recall
that firms, like consumers, cannot distinguish between a reviewer who really is low-type and
a reviewer who is the high-type but behaves as an effective low-type. The latter can help inflate
the reviews of bribing firms but the former cannot. When the prior about the reviewer being
low type increases, firms cease to offer bribes as the chances that the reviewer cannot help them
increase, and this leads to first-best information transmission.
Proposition 6 (Prior Beliefs). Suppose the environment is bribe-proof and consider decreasing the
prior probability of the high-type reviewer p (and thus increase the prior the reviewer is low-type).
Then the environment is still bribeproof.
We now turn our attention to a more subtle point about consumer welfare and prior beliefs.
While shifting prior beliefs closer to the low-skill types increases welfare for a given reviewer
type, we also increase the likelihood that the reviewer herself will be born with less skill, which
decreases welfare. These two effects compete to give an ambiguous net effect on expected
consumer welfare (where the expectation is over initial reviewer types): a higher likelihood of
poor reviewers means fewer bribes and information distortion, but also just lesser information
for the reviewer to transmit. We show in the following example, perhaps surprisingly, that
reducing the expected skills of the reviewer can lead to an improvement in (average) consumer
welfare because of its reduction in bribes:
Example 3 (Reviewer Skill and Welfare). Let us revisit the setting of Example 1, except where we
vary the probability p that the reviewer is high skill. The value of p is a proxy for the expected
skill of the reviewer or transparency in the product’s quality upon consumption. The maximal
bribe offered by the firm is b∗ = p/25, which implies the environment is bribeproof if β ≥ 10/3 ·p,
or p ≤ 3/10 · β. Consumer utility is proportional to 1.34p + 0.90(1 − p) when the environment
is bribeproof, and equal to 0.90 when the environment is not. In other words, consumer utility
is equivalent to 0.90 + 0.44 · p · 1p≤3/10·β . For different values of β, we plot ex-ante expected
consumer utility in Figure 1 as a function of p. Note in particular that it is non-monotone in
p, and is maximized at p = min{3/10 · β, 1}. The reason for this non-monotonicity lies in the
fact that increasing the (expected) skill of the reviewer improves information but also increases
incentives for bribes. Holding the latter constant, the former leads to an increasing in consumer
utility, per Proposition 2. However, the latter effect can dominate whereby the introduction of
bribes into the system when skills increase leads to a reduction in information transmission.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium Utility for Varying Ex-Ante Skill.
Example 3 illuminates an important counterintuitive finding: increasing the quality of
information and efficacy of reviews may not necessarily lead to better outcomes for consumers.
Because firms can also leverage the improvement in information for their own gain, it is possible
reviewers and firms extract greater surplus through bribes at the cost of hurting consumers.
6.3 Second-Best Outcomes and Bribe Funding
We now show that the presence of bribes can sometimes have a positive impact on consumer
utility. We assume throughout that reviewers do not value their own influence (β = 0) but
instead derive benefits entirely from bribes, and yet reviews are costly to write (C > 0). In this
case, it is straightforward to see that first-best information transmission is not possible, simply
because any (strategic) reviewer of high-skill will mimic-down to ωˆ = L: the high-skill reviewer
can only obtain payoffs from bribes, which only occurs if the reviewer can bias bribing firms.
Similarly, since the cost of writing a review is positive, she may abstain altogether unless there
is compensation from bribes. This is the worst case for consumer utility, which leads into the
following definition:
Definition 6 (Second-Best). An environment has second-best information transmission if both
reviewer types elect to play effective type ωˆ = L instead of abstaining.
We say this is second-best because of all the environments where β = 0, this outcome
maximizes consumer utility. We present our main result in this setting for second-best
outcomes. Interestingly, the worst outcome for consumer utility occurs when auditing
technology is most stringent. With lesser auditing however, utility increases and we eventually
get the (second-) best outcome. This is summarized in the following result.
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Proposition 7. There exists some prior p¯ ∈ (0, 1), C ∈ (C, C¯), and 0 < α < α < 1 such that for all
p > p¯ and C ∈ (C, C¯): (i) if α > α, the reviewer abstains and consumer utility is minimized, (ii) if
α < α, the second-best outcome is obtained.
Recall from Proposition 3 that when C > 0 and β = 0, the reviewer abstains from writing
a review and consumer utility is minimized. However, the introduction of bribing firms can
entice reviewers to participate. The private market funds the review writing (as a form of
advertisement), and while the incentives for writing these reviews are perverse and lead to
review manipulation, they nevertheless guarantee an improvement in utility compared to the
alternative of having no reviews altogether.
Finally, we consider an example with more reviewer types that generalizes the findings in
Proposition 7. In particular, we once again see that second-best outcomes may occur due to
bribe funding: the reviewer may mimic only one type down or even truthtell, which is funded
entirely by the firms.
Example 4 (Two-Sided Reputation). Consider Ω = {L,M,H}where the high-skill type is highly
likely but β = 0, so the influence of the reviewer has no inherent payoff to her. Let us assume the
same φ distribution as in Example 1, θ = 1/2 and σH = 1, but now we vary 1 ≤ σM ≤ σL ≤ 2.
Similar to before, the high-skill reviewer will mimic down to either low or middle, whichever
can solicit the larger bribe from the firm. Thus, we simply calculate the maximal bribe when
mimicking some type σˆ from Example 1:
b∗(σˆ) =
1
3
P[|(qt + εt)− (1 + σˆ2L)/2|]
=
1
3
(
1− 1
2pi
√
2(σˆ2 − 1)
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∫ −κ
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2
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)
In Figure 2, we see b∗ as a function of the effective type σˆ. This provides a tight characterization
of the information transmission in equilibrium: the high-type mimics arg maxσˆ∈{σM ,σL}. For
example, in terms of σˆ∗, the solution to arg maxσˆ b∗(σˆ), we have:
(i) If σˆM < σˆL < σˆ∗, then the high-type reviewer and the middle-type reviewer always mimic
the low type, or both abstain.
(ii) If σˆ∗ < σˆM < σˆL, then the high-type reviewer mimics the middle type and the middle type
reports truthfully (i.e., second-best), or both abstain.
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Figure 2. Maximal Bribes.
Whether the reviewer abstains in (i)/(ii), or mimics as described, depends on if b∗ exceeds
C. In this case, we get bribe funding, and in the special case of (ii), this bribe funding obtains
the second-best outcome, even when it is possible to mimic lower precision types. Note also
the similarity to our conclusions in Proposition 6 and Example 3: as skills atrophy, information
decreases, but the incentives for bribes also change, often in a way that can benefit consumer
utility. Here, this comes in the form of maintaining a stronger reputation with the consumers,
thereby improving the efficacy of the bias, and soliciting larger bribes. This highlights an
important feature: the presence of (larger) bribes in the system does not always translate into
a decrease in consumer utility.
The key tradeoff for the reviewer, as seen in Figure 2, is the following. When mimicking
a low type, bribing firms receive more bias in that, considering rt = (qt + εt) + |ε′t|, a larger
amount of their review variation comes from the (good) bias |ε′t|, which makes bribing more
attractive. On the other hand, we know from Theorem 4 that when the reviewer mimics worse
types, consumers more heavily discount her review, thereby making this additional bias less
advantageous. While the reviewer doesn’t care about inherent influence, she does care about
influence insofar as it may help her get larger bribes.
Example 4 provides two related insights. The first is that bribe funding can spawn review
writing, and the degree of review manipulation depends on the prior distribution over reviewer
skills and the consumer base in nuanced (and non-monotone) ways. Second, the reviewer
may choose to possess higher influence, even when she does not care about influence directly.
Rather, the desire for influence can arise endogenously from the two-sided interaction and the
reputation balance she needs to maintain between the firms and the consumers. In the extreme
case, the reviewer may even truthtell by accepting bribes while only “pretending” to bias, as to
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capture the largest possible influence with the consumers.
7 Final Remarks
The recent proliferation of review manipulation shows that the problem is multi-faceted and
can take on multiple forms. In this paper, we focused on the case where an influential reviewer
or expert can misrepresent her reviews in order to favor specific firms. We provided conditions
under which the reviewer can repeatedly do this without getting detected, and analyzed the
impact of such practice on consumer utility. Interestingly, we show that an increase in the
number of non-bribing firms might lead to the market becoming more vulnerable to bribes
and review distortions, and is therefore an aspect that perhaps should be taken into account
when regulators aim to crack down on bribing firms. Another possibility that could dilute
the effect of bribes is recognizing that at the center of the reviewer’s decision problem is a
tradeoff where she tries to balance her loss of influence (that comes from providing less accurate
reviews) with accepting side payments from firms, and implicit in this is the observation that an
increase in how reviewers value influence can offset the payoffs obtained from bribes and lead to
bribe-proof environments where reviewers always reports truthfully. The flip side is that when
reviewers have little or no inherent value for influence, their reviews may become extremely
noisy or they may stop writing reviews altogether, leading to a decline in consumer utility. In
this case, bribes provide a market mechanism that supports reviewers and funds the process of
review writing, and while the reviews will unavoidably be biased in this case, they still transmit
useful information to consumers and lead to an improvement in welfare.
As mentioned, review manipulation can manifest in other ways. For example, there are large-
scale manipulation attempts on platforms like Amazon, where product ratings are aggregated
from many reviews, and where the seller can source out these reviews to multiple agents who
would provide inflated product ratings in exchange for payments. This problem can possibly be
addressed by designing aggregation systems that take into account factors that suggest whether
a review is authentic or not, in similar ways to how some websites like fakespot or reviewmeta
flag some reviews as suspicious.
Finally, we remark that our work is applicable beyond the setup of online reviews. The
testing, inspection, and certification market is projected to be worth more than $400 Billion
by 2025 (Bloomberg (2019)). These markets cover a wide range of industries (manufacturing,
agriculture, healthcare, etc.) and share several attributes with the model developed in this paper,
where again an expert or an intermediary evaluates members of one side of the market, and that
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evaluation provides information that goes into the decisions of market participants and impacts
the overall efficiency of the marketplace. Despite the importance of these interactions and
their impact on all parties involved, their dynamic nature have not been analyzed or perfectly
understood, and we hope that the model in this paper serves as a first step in this direction.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. For part (a), notice the consumer-reviewer game is a dynamic game of
incomplete information of the form given in Fudenberg and Levine (1992), where a long-run
player plays against a sequence of short-run (myopic) players. Short-run players may observe
the the entire history of play (except for the bribes) since the public signal qt eliminates the
private information received by the reviewer about qt. Because bribes are given by bt(Ht), which
is a function only of this public history, the payoffs are determined by nature given Ht.
For part (b), consider firm t who chooses bt(Ht) conditional on the public history Ht. Note
the information set of the firm is uniquely determined by Ht, so can only choose (mixed)
strategies dependent on this. The firm takes as given the public belief of the reviewer’s type
pit, and acts myopically (choosing bt) by maximizing Epit [Ut], where the action of the reviewer
and consumers is given by the reviewer-consumer equilibrium identified in part (a). This is a
static game of incomplete information between the firm and the reviewer, who receives both a
current payoff and the continuation payoff from the reviewer-consumer equilibrium. Existence
is implied immediately by the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Section 6.4 in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
Proof of Theorem 2. Since β > 0, by Fudenberg and Levine (1992) there always exists an
equilibrium where the reviewer receives at least β · I∞(ω) > 0 (i.e., her Stackelberg payoff
under Assumption 2). Consider the the public belief p˜it that the reviewer is a truthful type
(of any precision). It is clear that p˜it is a bounded martingale, so converges almost surely as
t → ∞. Let us denote by r∗t (ω) the (distribution) of reviews by an honest reviewer of type
ω at time t (which is given by N (0, 1 + σ2ω) and cov(r∗t (ω), qt) = 1 as t → ∞). We know that
either the belief p˜it converges to zero or the reviewer mimics the truthful type in the sense that,
lim supt→∞ p˜it · ||rt − r∗t (ω)||∞ = 0 for some ω ∈ {H,L} (see Cripps et al. (2004)). Note for fixed
δ < 1, there always exists a cutoff p˜it such that for p˜it < p˜it, there is an equilibrium where the
reviewer abstains (rt′ = ∅) for all t ≥ t′ (and the consumer ignores any review written off the
equilibrium path). We call this equilibrium babbling-trigger. In a robust equilibrium (where the
equilibrium is assumed to be risk-dominant), the consumer must necessarily babble-trigger,
as this equilibrium obtains a payoff approaching 0 for a patient reviewer, which is the lowest
payoff possible. For the reviewer to obtain a payoff of at least β · I∞(ω) in equilibrium, she must
not be babble-triggered for at least:
T ∗ =
log
(
1− β·I∞(ω)2
)
log(δ)
− 1
periods. Since T ∗ → ∞ as δ → 1, we know for any fixed t, it cannot hold that lim infδ→1 p˜it → 0
in equilibrium, otherwise we have arrived at a contradiction of Fudenberg and Levine (1992)
that the reviewer obtains at least β · I∞(ω). Therefore, as δ → 1, it must be the case that
lim supt→∞ ||rt− r∗t (ωˆ)||∞ = 0 for some type ωˆ from the set of commitment types in equilibrium.
Since r∗t (ωˆ) is identifiable for every precision type ωˆ, it is clear the public belief pit of the
reviewer’s mimicking type ωˆ will converge to the true mimicked type almost surely by LLN. Since
33
as δ → 1 (and t→∞), we know ||rt − r∗t (ωˆ)||∞ → 0, consumers can compute E[qt|rt]:
P[qt|rt] = P[rt|qt]P[qt]∫∞
−∞ P[rt|q]P[q] dq
=
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2σ2ωˆ
)
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,
1 + σ2ωˆ
σ2ωˆ
)
And since consumers are myopic, they employ a cutoff strategy whereby if φi ≤ E[qt|rt] = rt1+σ2ωˆ ,
which is unique except on a set of measure zero.
Let St be a strategy for the reviewer (at time t) which maps bribes, signals, and the public
history, (bt, st, Ht), into reviews, rt. For a bribing firm t, we let S˜t(Ht) be its mixed strategy over
bribes, as a function of the public history Ht. Note the strategy employed by the reviewer is in
fact:
S∗t = θ · St(0, st, Ht) + (1− θ) ·
∫
bt∈S˜t(Ht)
St(bt, st, Ht) dbt
By our previous observation, it must be the true that limt→∞ ||S∗t − r∗t (ωˆ)||∞ → 0 for some ωˆ.
Note because the consumer can also observeHt, it must be true that for allHt, limt→∞ ||S∗t (Ht)−
r∗t (ωˆ)||∞ → 0. But, recall that r∗t (ωˆ) depends only on st and not bt or Ht. Therefore, in the limit
t→∞, S∗t cannot depend on Ht in the sense that ||S∗t (st, Ht)− S∗t (st, H ′t)||∞ → 0.
Consider any equilibrium where St(0, st, Ht) admits different ESt(0,st,Ht)[φ−1(rt/(1 + σ2ωˆ))]
for different histories, for infinitely many t (i.e., a sequence τ1, τ2, . . . , τk, . . .). Without loss of
generality, suppose that
ESt(0,st,Ht)
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]
< ESt(0,st,H′t)
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]
at some time τk. Instead, suppose the reviewer sets St(0, st, H ′t) ← St(0, st, Ht) and
St(bt, st, H
′
t) ← St(bt, st, Ht) at all times τk. It is clear that this can still be supported in
equilibrium because
ES∗t
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]
= E(S∗)′t
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]
= Er∗t
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]
Moreover, it must be the case that for bribing firms:
Ebt
[
ESt(bt,st,Ht)
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]]
> Ebt
[
ESt(bt,st,H′t)
[
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)]]
which implies that there exists an equilibrium where b′τ > bτ for all such τ , so such an
equilibrium is not maximal. This implies that St(0, st, Ht) cannot depend onHt as t→∞, which
34
immediately shows that
∫
bt∈S˜(Ht) St(bt, st, Ht) dbt may not depend on Ht either.
In a robust equilibrium, every firm acting at time t who enters chooses minbt(bt ∈
arg maxb′t EHt,pit [Ut]) because she breaks indifferences toward lower bribes because of the
infinitesimal proportional cost. Therefore the firm always plays a pure-strategy, and∫
bt∈S˜(Ht) St(bt, st, Ht) dbt immediately reduces to St(bt(Ht), st, Ht). In the limit t → ∞, because
r∗t (ωˆ) cannot depend on bt either, it must necessarily be the case that St does not depend on Ht;
that is, ||St(bt(Ht), st, Ht) − St(bt, st)||∞ → 0, for some St(bt, st). Since the payoff of the firm at t
is a function only of bt and X∗t , which is entirely determined by rt (given by St), and all strategic
firms are identical, the outcome of review manipulation is the same for all strategic firms. We can
thus write St(st), and note that in a maximal equilibrium, bt is given by the supremum over all
bribes supported by some equilibrium St(st) as t→∞, denoted by b∗ (not such a maximal bribe
cannot depend on t, because the reviewer’s strategy does not depend on Ht, including t). The
unique equilibrium outcome for the firms is given by strategic firms bribing b∗ and truthful firms
bribing 0. If limt→∞ ||S∗t (st)− rt(ωˆ)||∞ → 0 for some ωˆ, then S∗t (st) must converge in distribution
to a normal distribution N (0, σ2ωˆ + 1) with cov(S∗t (st), qt) = 1. Since this distribution is entirely
determined by its covariance matrix, S∗t (st) converges (in distribution) to a unique distribution.
Recall that we can write S∗(st) = θ · S(0, st) + (1 − θ) · S(b∗, st), and by the arguments in the
above paragraph, we know that S∗t (st) is constrained (in the limit) to have a normal distribution
N (0, σ2ωˆ + 1) with cov(S∗(st), qt) = 1. Consider some arbitrary S∗(st) which satisfies these
distributional constraints. Note that S∗(st) − st is normally distributed and uncorrelated with
qt, so in particular, are independent of qt. For any strategy S∗(st) − st to be independent of qt
as t → ∞, since qt is not observed ex-ante by the reviewer, it must be the case that S∗(st) − st
is independent of st. Therefore, S∗(st) − st must have the distribution N (0, σ2ωˆ − σ2ω) and be
orthogonal to st. Therefore, we can write S∗(st) = st + ε′t, where ε′t is orthogonal to st and has
this distribution. Rewritten:
S∗(st) = st + θ · (S(0, st)− st) + (1− θ) · (S(b∗, st)− st)
It is easy to see that S(0, st) − st must be independent of st in any maximal bribe, for the same
reason St must be independent of Ht. Since S∗(st) − st is independent of st, this implies that
S(b∗, st)− st is independent of st (again, because all distributions are Gaussian). Consider some
S˜∗ with S˜(0, st) = st+ε′t with ε′t ∼ Nθ(0, σ2ωˆ−σ2ω) and S˜(b∗, st) = st+ε′t with ε′t ∼ 1−Nθ(0, σ2ωˆ−σ2ω)
as given in Theorem 5. It is easy to check that S˜∗(st) satisfies the distributional constraints. We
claim that S˜(b∗, st)− st first-order stochastically dominates all other distributions subject to the
distributional constraints: (i) S(b∗, st)−st is orthogonal to st; (ii) S∗(st)−st ∼ N (0, σ2ωˆ−σ2ω); and
therefore, generates the maximal bribe b∗. Consider some Sˆ(b∗, st) satisfying these conditions.
Note that for any a < (σ2ωˆ−σ2ω) ·Φ−1(1− θ), then P[S˜(b∗, st)− st ≥ a] = 1, and so P[S˜(b∗, st)− st ≥
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a] ≥ P[Sˆ(b∗, st)− st ≥ a] trivially. For any a ≥
√
σ2ωˆ − σ2ω · Φ−1(1− θ):
P[S˜(b∗, st)− st ≥ a] =
1− Φ
(
a√
σ2ωˆ−σ2ω
)
1− θ
=
1
1− θP[Sˆ
∗(st)− st ≥ a]
=
1
1− θ
(
θ · P[Sˆ∗(st)− st ≥ a|b = 0] + (1− θ) · P[Sˆ∗(st)− st ≥ a|b = b∗]
)
=
θ
1− θP[Sˆ
∗(st)− st ≥ a|b = 0] + P[Sˆ∗(st)− st ≥ a|b = b∗]
≥ P[Sˆ∗(st)− st ≥ a|b = b∗]
= P[Sˆ∗(b∗, st)− st ≥ a]
which shows that S˜(b∗, st)−st FOSD Sˆ(b∗, st)−st, so the expected review under S˜(b∗, st) is always
strictly higher than under Sˆ(b∗, st), and so is expected consumption.
It is also to easy to see that in every equilibrium the firm must enter under Assumption 2.
Otherwise, the reviewer is forced to abstain for (1−θ) > 0 fraction of firms, which implies she gets
discounted average payoff of 0 as δ → 1 (either from babbling-trigger or from always abstaining),
which is a contradiction, because the reviewer must obtain at least her Stackelberg payoff.
Finally, we need only show that there is a unique ωˆ the high-type reviewer mimics
in the maximal equilibrium, under generic conditions (since the low-type reviewer’s
strategy is fixed, by Theorem 3). Recall the reviewer’s (realized) payoff is given by
V (ωˆ) = (1 − δ)∑∞t=1 δt(β · It(ωˆ) + bt(ωˆ)). Suppose that for ωˆ1 < ωˆ2, we have V (ωˆ1) = V (ωˆ2)
as δ → 1. Because (1 − δ)E [∑∞t=1 δtIt(ωˆ1)] > (1 − δ)E [∑∞t=1 δtIt(ωˆ2)] it must necessarily be
the case that (1 − δ)E [∑∞t=1 δtb1t ] < (1 − δ)E [∑∞t=1 δtb2t ], where b1t and b2t are the bribes given
under ωˆ1, ωˆ2, respectively. Thus, for any sufficiently small  > 0, setting β ← β ±  breaks the
indifference and does not affect the payoffs of the firm or consumer, so bt is still supported in
equilibrium. Thus, for generic β, there is a unique choice for ωˆ for the high-type reviewer.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Theorem 2, as t → ∞ we know the reviewer mimics a commitment type
ωˆ. Thus, it just remains to show that the reviewer must mimic-down. Consider σωˆ < σω. Let
ft : st 7→ rt be any stochastic function (possibly time-varying) mapping the reviewer’s signals
into reviews. Since st is a sufficient statistic for qt (given rt), by the Fisher-Neyman factorization
theorem we can represent ft(st) = gt(st, qt)ht(rt) for some functions gt, ht. Thus, the Fisher
information from st, Ist(qt), and the Fisher information from rt, Irt(qt), satisfies Ist ≥ Irt
by the chain rule. It is also easy to see that Isˆt > Ist if σωˆ < σω. Thus, it is impossible that
limt→∞ ||rt(ω)− r∗t (ωˆ)||∞ → 0, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4 and 5. These follow immediately from the arguments in Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Theorem 4, we know that pit
a.s.→ 1σˆ, and therefore E[qτ |rτ , piτ ] a.s.→
E[qτ |rτ ,1σˆ], so by Theorem 3, we know that these are eventually i.i.d. random variables. By
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Kolmogorov’s strong law (see Sen and Singer (1994) Theorem 2.3.10), we know that:
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(φ−1(E[qτ |rτ , piτ ])− φ−1(0))2 a.s.→ Eqτ ,rτ
[
(φ−1(E[qτ |rτ ,1σˆ])− φ−1(0))2
]
= I∞(σˆ)
where the final equality can be seen by simply integrating out qτ . Recall we have that:
I∞(ωˆ) =
1√
2pi(1 + σˆ2)
∫ ∞
−∞
(
φ−1
(
rt
1 + σ2ωˆ
)
− φ−1(0)
)2
· exp
(
− r
2
t
2(1 + σ2ωˆ)
)
drt
Let us make the substitution α = rt/
√
1 + σ2ωˆ:
I∞(ωˆ) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
φ−1
 α√
1 + σ2ωˆ
− φ−1(0)
2 · exp(−α2/2) dα
Note that φ−1(·) is an increasing function, and
∣∣∣α/√1 + σ2ωˆ∣∣∣ is decreasing in σωˆ, so the integrand
is decreasing in σωˆ pointwise for all α. Thus I∞(ωˆ) is decreasing in σωˆ.
Proof of Proposition 2. As in Proposition 1, we can write:
C¯U t =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
CUτ =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
∫ 1
0
(qτ − φi) · 1E[qτ |rτ ,piτ ]≥φi di
and via Theorem 3 and 4, we know these are eventually i.i.d. random variables, which implies by
Kolmogorov’s strong law:
C¯U t
a.s.→
∫ 1
0
Eqτ ,rτ
[
(qτ − φi) · 1E[qτ |rτ ,1σˆ ]≥φi
]
di ≡ C¯U∞(σˆ)
Any consumer i with outside option φi is an active consumer at time t if and only if E[qt|rt] =
rt/(1 + σˆ
2) ≥ φi, or in other words, rt ≥ (1 + σˆ2)φi. The average utility as t→∞ can be measured
as:
CUi =
1
2σˆpi
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
(1+σˆ2)φi
(q − φi) exp(−q2/2) exp
(
−(r − q)
2
2σˆ2
)
dr dq
By Fubini’s theorem, let us reverse the order of integration and evaluate:
CUi =
1
2σˆpi
∫ ∞
(1+σˆ2)φi
∫ ∞
−∞
(q − φi) exp(−q2/2) exp
(
−(r − q)
2
2σˆ2
)
dq dr
=
1√
2pi(1 + σˆ2)3/2
∫ ∞
(1+σˆ2)φi
(r − (1 + σˆ2)φi) exp
(
− r
2
2(1 + σˆ2)
)
dr
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Let us make the same change of variables α = r/
√
1 + σˆ2:
CUi =
√
1 + σˆ2√
2pi(1 + σˆ2)3/2
∫ ∞
√
1+σˆ2φi
(√
1 + σˆ2α− (1 + σˆ2)φi
)
exp
(−α2/2) dα
=
1√
2pi(1 + σˆ2)
∫ ∞
√
1+σˆ2φi
(
α−
√
1 + σˆ2φi
)
exp(−α2/2) dα
Making a final change of variables to κ = α−√1 + σˆ2φi, we have that:
CUi =
1√
2pi(1 + σˆ2)
∫ ∞
0
κ exp
(
−(κ+
√
1 + σˆ2φi)
2
2
)
dκ
=
1√
2pi(σˆ2 + 1)
exp
(
−φ
2
i (1 + σˆ
2)
2
)
− 1
2
φierfc
(
φi
√
1 + σˆ2√
2
)
where erfc(·) is the complementary error function, erfc(z) = 2√
pi
∫∞
z e
−x2dx. Let us write ζ =√
1 + σˆ2, so that
CUi =
1√
2piζ
exp
(
−φ
2
i ζ
2
2
)
− 1
2
φierfc
(
φiζ√
2
)
Differentiating with respect to ζ, we obtain:
[∂ζ] : −
(√
2
pi
+
1√
2piζ2
)
exp
(
−φ
2
i ζ
2
2
)
< 0
Therefore, CUi is decreasing in ζ for all i, which implies it is decreasing in σˆ. Hence, the average
consumer utility is also decreasing in σˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3. When firms are truthful, the payoff to the reviewer is just given by
her influence β · I∞(σˆ), less the cost of writing a review C, given she mimics type σˆ. By
Proposition 1, the reviewer’s influence is maximized when σˆ = σ (given Theorem 3 which says
the reviewer may only mimic down), so if the reviewer writes a review, she reports honestly
rt = st to maximize her long-run (discounted) payoff. The reviewer abstains if on the other
hand β · I∞(σ) < C; thus, β∗(C) = C/I∞(σ), which is increasing in C. Finally, by Proposition 2,
and by Theorem 3 the reviewer can only mimic down, consumer utility is maximized when the
reviewer is truthful and is minimized when the reviewer abstains, because this is identical to the
σˆ →∞ case.
Proof of Theorem 6. The firm’s bribe is bounded above by b∗ = 1 − γ, so the expected bribe
received by the reviewer is at most (1 − θ) · (1 − γ). Because β > 0 and I∞(σH) > I∞(σL), it is
clear that for (1− θ) < (1− θ¯) ≡ 1−γβ(I∞(σH)−I∞(σL)) , the high-type reviewer would prefer to mimic
her true type than mimic down and receive bribes (which holds for θ > θ¯).
Similarly, when θ → 0, if the reviewer is high-skill mimicking low-skill, we see that the firm
receives (net) expected consumption from bribing equal to (X¯∗ − γ), as per Theorem 5 she
receives review rt ∼ qt+t+ε′t where ε′t ∼ limθ→0 1−Nθ(0, σ2L−σ2H) = N (0, σ2L−σ2H), which implies
that rt ∼ N (0, 1+σ2L) and total expected consumption is given simply by X¯∗. On the other hand,
if she does not bribe she receives rt ∼ qt+t+ε′t where ε′t ∼ limθ→0Nθ(0, σ2L−σ2H) = Dirac(−∞),
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so total expected consumption is 0, which falls below the firm’s outside option γ. Thus, the firm
does not enter the market and receives a payoff of 0. The difference in these gives the maximal
bribe of b∗ = X¯∗ − γ, whereas the reviewer loses an (average) influence payoff of:
β(I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)) > ψ(I∞(σH)− I∞(σL))
= X¯∗ − γ = b∗
Because b∗ is continuous in θ, and as θ → 1 the environment is bribeproof because the loss
in influence payoff (strictly) exceeds the maximal bribe, there must exist θ¯ such that for all
θ > θ¯ this property still holds, so the environment remains bribeproof. By continuity, strict
increasing, and the boundary conditions on α(θ), applying the intermediate value theorem
we can find lower and upper bounds onα such that the environments are bribeproof as well.
Proof of Proposition 4. For ease of notation, we call ν ≡ 1
2pi
√
(1+σ2H)(σ
2
H−σ2L)
. When the
proportion of truthful firms is θ, note the total expected consumption obtained from bribing is
given by:
1
(1− θ)ν
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
√
σ2H−σ2L·Φ−1(θ)
φ−1
(
s+ ε′
1 + σ2L
)
· exp
(
− s
2
2(1 + σ2H)
)
· exp
(
− (ε
′)2
2(σ2L − σ2H)
)
dε′ ds
which we denote as κ(θ). On the other hand, the expected consumption from not bribing is
given by:
1
θν
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ √σ2H−σ2L·Φ−1(θ)
−∞
φ−1
(
s+ ε′
1 + σ2L
)
· exp
(
− s
2
2(1 + σ2H)
)
· exp
(
− (ε
′)2
2(σ2L − σ2H)
)
dε′ ds
which we denote by ζ(θ)/θ. Therefore, the maximal (average) bribe is given by b¯∗(θ) = (1 −
θ)
(
pκ(θ) + min{−pζ(θ)/θ, (1− p)X¯∗ − γ}) (see Proposition 6). Differentiating with respect to θ
and applying the fundamental theorem of calculus:
∂b¯∗(θ)
∂θ
= −pη(θ) + p
[
1
θ2
ζ(θ)− 1− θ
θ
η(θ)
]
· 1ζ(θ)/θ≥γ/p−(1−p)/p·X¯∗ + (γ − (1− p)X¯∗)1ζ(θ)/θ<γ/p−(1−p)/p·X¯∗
=
p
θ
· (ζ(θ)/θ − η(θ)) · 1ζ(θ)/θ≥γ/p−(1−p)/p·X¯∗ + (γ − (1− p)X¯∗ − η(θ)) · 1ζ(θ)/θ<γ/p−(1−p)/p·X¯∗
where
η(θ) ≡ ∂Φ
−1(θ)/∂θ
2pi
√
1 + σ2H
·exp (−(Φ−1(θ))2/2)·∫ ∞
−∞
φ−1
s+
√
σ2H − σ2L · Φ−1(θ)
1 + σ2L
·exp(− s2
2(1 + σ2H)
)
ds
and noting that [(1− θ)κ(θ)]′ = −η(θ) and ζ ′(θ) = η(θ). By the inverse function theorem, one can
see that ∂Φ−1(θ)/∂θ =
√
2pi exp((Φ−1(θ))2/2), so the above reduces to:
η(θ) =
1√
2pi(1 + σ2H)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
φ−1
s+
√
σ2H − σ2L · Φ−1(θ)
1 + σ2L
 · exp(− s2
2(1 + σ2H)
)
ds
Note that since limx→−∞ E[φ−1(y)|y ≤ x] = 0, we know that limθ→0 ζ(θ)/θ = 0. Similarly since
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limθ→0 Φ−1(θ) = −∞, we see limθ→0 η(θ) = 0. Therefore, fixing some small γ > 0, we obtain
on an open interval θ ∈ (0, θ) where ∂b¯∗(θ)/∂θ > 0 for p sufficiently close to 1 (as then ζ(θ)/θ <
γ/p−(1−p)/p·X¯∗) . This implies there exists θ∗ ∈ (0, θ) such that b¯∗(θ∗) > limθ→0 b¯∗(θ). Choosing
β∗ such that:
limθ→0 b¯∗(θ)
I∞(σH)− I∞(σL) < β
∗ <
b¯∗(θ∗)
I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)
implies there is a region (0, θ1) that is bribeproof, whereas (θ∗ − , θ∗ + ) experiences bribes for
some small . Simultaneously, by the same logic as in Theorem 6, one can always find θ4 such
that with θ ∈ (θ4, 1) for this particular β∗ that admits a bribeproof environment. Noting the
continuity, strict increasing, and boundary conditions of α(θ) as in Theorem 6 then proves the
claim.
Proof of Proposition 5. It is easy to verify that C¯U∞(σˆ) from Proposition 2 is continuous in
σˆ, so as ∆ → 0 we know that C¯U∞(σL) → C¯U∞(σH), and thus the first-best consumer utility is
attained. When the reviewer mimics low-type, we know the payoff from a bribe is given by:
Eqt,εt,ε′t∼1−Nθ(0,σ2H−σ2L)
[
φ−1
(
qt + εt + ε
′
t
1 + σ2L
)]
− Eqt,εt,ε′t∼Nθ(0,σ2H−σ2L)
[
φ−1
(
qt + εt + ε
′
t
1 + σ2L
)]
If ∆ → ∞, then it must be that σL → ∞, and by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem
(since φ−1 is bounded on [0, 1]), we have that:
lim
σL→∞
Eqt,εt,ε′t∼1−Nθ(0,σ2H−σ2L)
[
φ−1
(
qt + εt + ε
′
t
1 + σ2L
)]
= lim
σL→∞
Eqt,εt,ε′t∼Nθ(0,σ2H−σ2L)
[
φ−1
(
qt + εt + ε
′
t
1 + σ2L
)]
= φ−1(0)
which implies the maximal bribe satisfies b∗ → 0. Since β > 0, the high-type reviewer mimics
her own type as σL → ∞, which makes the environment bribeproof and therefore attains
first-best consumer utility.
Proof of Proposition 6. Note the value of a bribe is given given by the difference between
the firm entering and bribing and her next best option (either entering and not bribing, or
staying out). Let us denote by X and X as the consumption when the reviewer biases the firm
down and up, respectively, when she is actually the high-type reviewer but mimics the low type.
If the firm enters and bribes, she receives pX + (1 − p)X¯∗, whereas if the firm enters and does
not bribe, she receives pX + (1 − p)X¯∗, and if she stays out she receives γ. Therefore, the value
of the bribe is given by:
min{pX + (1− p)X¯∗ − (pX + (1− p)X¯∗), pX + (1− p)X¯∗ − γ} = pX + min{−pX, (1− p)X¯∗ − γ}
The environment is bribeproof if pX + min{−pX, (1− p)X¯∗ − γ} < β(I∞(σH)− I∞(σL)) and
otherwise admits bribes (see Theorem 2). Since the right-hand side of the inequality is constant
with respect to p but the left-hand side is increasing in p (as X > X¯∗ > X), if the inequality
holds with a given p, it still holds with any p′ < p, so the environment is still bribeproof for any
p′ < p if it is bribeproof with p.
Proof of Proposition 7. As in Theorem 6 and Proposition 4, it is enough to find thresholds
40
0 < θ < θ < 1 instead. Once again, bribes are bounded above by 1, so for (1 − θ) < C, or
θ > 1 − C, the reviewer will opt to not write a review in any period, which minimizes consumer
utility as noted in Proposition 3. Therefore, taking θ¯ = max{0, 1−C} < 1, we establish the upper
threshold for any given C.
In any equilibrium where the high-skill reviewer does not abstain, we know she mimics low
type because β = 0. As θ → 0, firms pay a maximal bribe given by min{pX¯∗, X¯∗ − γ}, which
can be seen by using the expression in Proposition 6 and substituting X = X¯∗ and X = 0. By
Assumption 2 (i.e., X¯∗ − γ > 0) implies b∗ > 0 for p > p¯ with p¯ sufficiently close to 1. Letting b∗
be the bribe for p = p¯, we see that as θ → 0 the reviewer receives at least b∗ > 0, which implies
there is an open interval (θ, 1) where the reviewer can receive bribes bounded below by some
b > 0 for θ ∈ (θ, 1). Choosing C = b/2 and C = b/4 completes the proof, as the high-type and
low-type reviewer both receive the same bribes and mimic the low type for all θ ∈ (θ, 1), which
is second-best.
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